In his account of how democratic states have dealt with major crises over the past century, David Runciman argues that responsiveness to public opinion makes democracies more adaptable than autocratic regimes. They perform well in emergencies, but in doing so fall into a confidence trap since electoral politics demands short-term solutions at the expense of long-term planning. They are good at dealing with emergencies but bad at avoiding them.

It is possible to see this logic in the historical record of Australian statecraft. The country was faced with an unprecedented threat when Japan entered the Second World War, and the measures taken to meet it mobilised the population for a total war effort. In federal elections in 1943 and 1946 voters were prepared to accept measures of economic and social reconstruction that strengthened the nation’s capacity, inaugurated a period of sustained growth, rising living standards and increased social provision. The national purpose had faltered by the 1960s, but it was not until a decade of futile argument over public policy failed to break the stagflation caused by the OPEC oil crisis that an Accord allowed the Hawke government to undertake measures needed to revive growth.